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New Zealand experienced a sharp rise in labour force participation rates among older 
people over the period 1991￿2001.  This stands in contrast to the experience of most 
other OECD countries where such participation rates have been in steady decline.  The 
predominant reason for this turnaround was that the age of eligibility for New Zealand 
Superannuation, the universal public pension, was raised from 60 to 65 over a nine-year 
period.  Combining an earlier reduction in eligibility age with this later policy reversal, this 
paper estimates the effect of public pension eligibility on the labour force participation of 
different age groups.  The paper discusses why particular features of New Zealand￿s 
pension system mean that the strength and rapidity of the response to a rise in eligibility 
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The effect of New Zealand 
Superannuation eligibility age on 
the labour force participation of 
older people  
1 Introduction 
 
The design of retirement income policies can have a major effect on people￿s retirement 
decisions.
1
  This paper looks at the evidence on changing employment and retirement 
patterns among older people in response to changes in public pension policy and in 
particular the age of eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation (NZS).
2
  Two clear policy 
changes to the eligibility age have occurred within the past 30 years: an instantaneous 
drop in the age of eligibility in 1977 and a progressive increase in the age from 1992.  
These two natural experiments enable us to estimate the strength of the labour force 
participation response to NZS eligibility by older workers. 
In common with many other countries, New Zealand experienced declining rates of 
employment among older people during the 1970s and 1980s, despite improving life 
expectancies.  However, the past decade has seen a significant reversal of this trend in 
New Zealand, making this country an ￿outlier￿ of particular interest to other countries 
concerned to manage the burgeoning costs of their public pension schemes and the 
prospect of a shrinking workforce. 
This paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the trend towards earlier 
retirement across many OECD countries and how the financial incentives embedded 
within public pension policy influence retirement decisions and can lead to clear 
differences in patterns of older persons￿ labour force participation over time and across 
countries.  Section 3 analyses the participation/retirement incentive effects inherent in the 
New Zealand public pension system and describes the policy changes in 1977 and 1992 
that appear to have triggered large shifts in behaviour.  Section 4 presents the estimates 
of the effect on labour force participation of these policy changes and Section 5 draws 
some conclusions.  
                                                                  
1  The OECD (1991) noted four possible interpretations of the term “retirement”: complete withdrawal from the labour force, the 
termination of a particular career path with a shift to a “subsidiary” job, a substantial reduction in weekly hours worked in the “main” job, 
and a change in a person’s income mix such that a significant share is in the form of pension income.  In this paper I use the first 
meaning: complete withdrawal from the labour force.  The results reported here may therefore underestimate the overall effect of policy 
changes on “retirement” more broadly interpreted to include reduced hours of work. 
2  This public pension has previously been termed National Superannuation (NS) and Guaranteed Retirement Income (GRI).  
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2  Trends in retirement 
Labour force participation rates among OECD countries for the working age population as 
a whole have been fairly steady over the past 30 years.  They rose by an average 0.2 
percent per annum between 1975 and 1989 but then fell by 0.1 percent per annum 
through the 1990s.  These growth figures refer to the average participation rates for the 
population in each country aged 15 and over.  However, these broad trends disguise 
some noticeably different movements across countries, among age groups and between 
men and women.   In this paper I concentrate on the age groups approaching retirement. 
Across many OECD countries, the trend over the past 30 years has been for people to 
retire at a younger age, despite evidence of improvements in life expectancy.  This trend 
can be seen in generally falling rates of labour force participation among males in the age 
group 55￿64 years, as shown in Figure 1.   In their research programme on social security 
programmes and retirement around the world, Gruber and Wise (2002) comment that the 
decline in labour force participation of older persons is perhaps the most dramatic feature 
of labour force change over the past decades. 
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Source:  OECD Labour Market Statistics for countries other than New Zealand.  New Zealand data from Census documents (prior 
to 1986 these have been adjusted for a change in the coverage of ‘actively engaged’). 
Figure 1 shows that the experience of New Zealand stands in contrast to that of other 
countries.  The decline in labour force participation rates of older males that New Zealand 
shared with other OECD countries over the period 1971￿1991 was reversed over the 
subsequent 10 years.  New Zealand changed from experiencing a participation rate that in 
the earlier period was about average among the comparator countries shown in Figure 1 
to one that, by 2001, was clearly higher than all the other comparator countries. 
A similar pattern of divergence between New Zealand and other OECD country 
participation rates has occurred since 1991 in the case of older females, but in this case it 
has overlaid a generally rising trend of female participation.  
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This paper argues that the primary reason for New Zealand￿s sharp turnaround in older 
people￿s labour force participation since 1991 was the phased increase in the eligibility 
age for the public pension, NZS, from 60 to 65 years, which commenced in 1992.   
Delayed eligibility to the public pension has resulted in many people delaying their 
retirement from the paid work force.    
2.1  Retirement decisions and pension policy design 
Clearly, many factors can influence individual decisions about when to leave the paid work 
force.   Among the primarily non-financial reasons for leaving the labour market could be 
poor health, family caring responsibilities, the retirement of a spouse, pressure of informal 
age-based discrimination, redundancy and a wish to undertake voluntary work or simply to 
enjoy more leisure time.  Possible financial factors affecting individual retirement decisions 
would include accumulated assets, current and prospective earnings and the value of any 
pension entitlements.  
This paper focuses on the factors that help to explain cross-country differences, by age 
and gender groups, in average rates of labour force participation, rather than factors that 
tend to differentiate among individuals.  It uses census data and an analysis of changes in 
public pension policy settings to estimate the strength of one of these factors in the         
New Zealand setting.  A more complete explanation of the variability of individual 
retirement behaviour would require an analysis of longitudinal unit record data (such as 
the US Health and Retirement Study), which is not available for New Zealand for the 
period of interest
3
.    
Public policy can affect the financial incentive to retire through different channels.  First it 
can affect the replacement rate, that is, the ratio of the amount of income in retirement to 
income when in the paid work force.  A high replacement rate means that the opportunity 
cost of leisure, in terms of foregone consumption, is low, making retirement a relatively 
more attractive option.  The replacement rate facing a worker at a particular age can be 
influenced by policies that determine eligibility for a retirement pension or similar benefit, 
conditions that might attach to that benefit, and the net level of pension entitlement.  
The second channel of influence is through changes in net pension wealth that occur 
when a worker defers retirement.  Such a deferral may result in a larger future annual 
pension entitlement, but for a smaller expected number of years.  If the discounted value 
of that pension stream is less than the discounted value of the pension stream available 
by retiring today, then continuing to work carries an implicit tax.  Conversely, if pension 
wealth increases by working an additional year, there is a subsidy to delay retirement 
(OECD, 2002: p143).  The way in which a country￿s public pension entitlement formula 
responds to changes in earnings and years of contribution will clearly affect this incentive.
4
  
Less directly, public policies that encourage or discourage the development of voluntary 
private and occupational saving schemes may affect the retirement incentive, since such 
schemes provide further options, such as lump-sum benefits at an earlier age. 
An important factor influencing retirement rates is the age at which a person can claim a 
retirement benefit.  Many countries￿ pension plans set both a ￿normal￿ and an ￿early￿ 
                                                                  
3  Some longitudinal data is becoming available, with the Linked Employer-Employee Data project and the evolution of the Survey of 
Families, Income and Employment Dynamics, which is in its third year. 
4  Gruber and Wise (1999, 2002 and 2005) have compared differences in pension rules across countries and find a clear association 
between the size of the incentive, which they call “the tax force to retire”, and the proportion of older people no longer in the workforce, 
which they call “unused labour force capacity”.  
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retirement benefit eligibility age.  The retirement rate at both these specific ages is 
typically substantially greater than would be predicted on the basis of financial measures 
alone.  This may be due to a liquidity constraint (people having insufficient savings to 
retire before any public benefit or pension is available) and a ￿social custom￿ effect, where 
the normal age of pension eligibility is regarded as the customary age of retirement 
(Gruber and Wise, 2002). 
The substantial reduction in effective retirement ages in most OECD countries over the 
past 30 years can be explained largely in terms of wider access to pension schemes 
offering early retirement options and other incentives towards early retirement that were 
part of the structure of many pension schemes.  There are now signs that the trend to 
earlier retirement has become a matter of concern for OECD countries facing the fiscal, 
employment and growth implications of aging populations and many are now starting to 
change their policies with the aim of increasing the labour force participation of older 
people (OECD, 2002).  The OECD (2005a) reports that since the late 1990s effective 
retirement ages have increased by more than one year in Australia, the United Kingdom 
and Finland, and by more than two years in Italy. 
3  New Zealand￿s public pension system 
This section discusses the features of New Zealand￿s public pension system
5
 that are 
most relevant to labour force participation decisions and goes on to describe the policy 
changes that led to the turnaround in this country￿s participation trend seen in Figure 1. 
3.1 Structural  differences 
New Zealand￿s public pension system differs significantly from those in many other 
countries in several important respects. Four key features are discussed below: an 
emphasis on social protection; having no mandatory retirement age; pensions not being 
contingent on retirement; and limited early retirement options. 
Emphasis on social protection  
In its recent review of pension systems across OECD countries, the OECD (2005b) used 
a typology for classifying pension systems that is based on the two main goals of public 
pension systems: first, the prevention of destitution in old age by redistributing income 
towards low-income pensioners (social protection) and, second, helping workers to 
maintain their living standards in retirement (earnings replacement).  Within these two 
main goals, systems can take several possible forms, which entails a further level of 
system classification.   
This typology differs somewhat from the well-known ￿three-pillar￿ classification of pension 
systems originally developed by the World Bank (1994).
6
  That classification has been 
criticised as being unsuitable because it is prescriptive rather than descriptive, although 
                                                                  
5  The relevant legislation is the New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001.  
6  The World Bank recommended that countries should seek to develop a three pillar old age financial security structure, comprising (1) 
a tax financed publicly managed pillar for income redistribution and old age poverty alleviation, (2) a mandatory, fully funded, privately 
managed pillar for individual income smoothing (saving), and (3) a voluntary, fully funded pillar for additional personal saving.    
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the recent revision and extension of it by Holzmann and Hinz (2005) has gone some way 
to addressing accusations that the World Bank￿s prescriptions were too inflexible.
7
 
The OECD notes that most countries pursue both goals (social protection and earnings 
replacement) in their overall pension policy, but there is a large variation in the balance of 
emphasis between the two.  New Zealand is at one extreme because it has historically 
placed a heavy emphasis on the objective of social protection rather than earnings 
replacement.  For example, the influential 1972 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social 
Security in New Zealand concluded: 
The community￿s first responsibility for income maintenance is to give benefits which 
will enable its dependent sections to reach an adequate standard of living.  This can 
best be done by a system of selective flat-rate benefits and allowances. 
Adopting an earnings-related benefit system would not help those sections of the 
community to whom it owes its first responsibility.  On the contrary their interests 
would most probably be prejudiced. 
However desirable it may be for individuals to maintain their customary earnings and 
status, the community is not, and should not become, responsible for securing this 
status, particularly by imposing a compulsory scheme.  
Royal Commission of Inquiry (1972: p181). 
This view that a mandatory savings scheme is undesirable can also be seen expressed in 
the Report of the Todd Task Force (Task Force on Private Provision for Retirement, 
1992), the Multi-party Accord on Retirement Incomes Policies (Accord Parties, 1993), and 
the heavy defeat in 1997 of a public referendum proposal to introduce a compulsory 
retirement savings scheme.  Topping up the basic level of NZS by means of a second 
pension to achieve a high rate of income replacement continues to be viewed as a matter 
of individual responsibility and decision, with the government￿s role being focused on 
encouraging work-based savings, providing education and information services, 
minimizing tax distortions on saving and reducing compliance costs.
8
 
A result is that almost all older people meet the eligibility requirements and receive the 
basic amount of NZS.
9
  At the same time, voluntary saving in private superannuation 
schemes has not been particularly high.  A survey by Statistics New Zealand (2002) 
reported that 21% of working age couples and non-partnered individuals had private or 
employer-sponsored superannuation assets, with a median value of only $25,000.  The 
report commented that: 
New Zealanders tend to hold most of their assets in the form of real assets and hold 
proportionally low amounts in financial assets￿ There also does not appear to be a 
culture of wage and salary earners investing a large part of their savings into the 
share market or in managed funds (as is more common in the United States). 
                                                                  
7  “[From this reassessment comes] … an appreciation of the diversity of effective approaches, including the number of pillars, the 
appropriate balance among the various pillars, and the way in which each pillar is formulated in response to particular circumstances or 
needs.  Some pension systems function effectively with only a zero pillar (in the form of a universal social pension) and a third pillar of 
voluntary savings…” (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005).  This is essentially the New Zealand structure.   
8  The most recent review, by the Periodic Report Group (2003), proposed no change from the current voluntary approach to private 
provision and reported no strong interest in departing from the current voluntary model among the submissions it had received. It 
should be noted, however, that government encouragement of work-based saving through the recently announced, optional Kiwi Saver 
scheme will include an element of subsidy. 
9  Take-up rates of NZS are estimated to be in excess of 95% of the age-eligible population.  A relatively small number of people fail to 
meet the New Zealand residence test for NZS, which is to have spent at least 10 years of working age life in the country, and at least 
five years since age 50.  
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This pattern of heavy reliance on NZS as the major source of retirement income has 
reinforced the strong link between retirement decisions and the age at which people 
become eligible for NZS.  Planned early retirement options are limited both by the 
absence of a trade-off between the timing and amount of NZS, and by the relatively low 
incidence of private pension arrangements that might offer that option.   
Mandatory retirement is outlawed 
Many countries allow employers to set a mandatory retirement age and eligibility for 
company pensions is often linked to this age.  Under New Zealand￿s Human Rights Act 
1993, however, it has been unlawful since 1999 for an employer to require the retirement 
of an employee solely on the basis of his or her age, even at and beyond the NZS 
eligibility age.
10
  Through the 1990s retirement became increasingly a matter of individual 
employee choice, or a consequence of demonstrated poor job performance, rather than 
determined by a standard age provision in an employment contract. 
The removal of any mandatory retirement provisions from employment contracts has 
opened up a wider range of employment options from both employers￿ and employees￿ 
points of view and has no doubt facilitated the rise in employment rates among those 
above NZS eligibility age.
11
   
Pension not contingent upon retirement 
A third significant difference from many other systems is that NZS is not subject to any 
income test or other means test, nor is it contingent upon retirement from paid 
employment.  Provided they are age-qualified for NZS, people receive the same amount 
whether or not they remain employed in the labour market. 
This has important implications for analysing the work incentive effects of public pension 
entitlements.  In models of retirement behaviour involving decisions based on changes in 
net pension wealth or the implicit social security tax on work, the present New Zealand 
structure is an outlier.  This is because one can choose to stay an extra year in paid 
employment and still receive the same flow of pension payments as if one had retired; the 
discounted future value of pension entitlements is essentially independent of the age of 
retirement.
12
  Alternatively, one can say that the implicit social security tax on work is zero. 
Limited early retirement options 
A fourth feature is that the fixed age of eligibility for NZS means that there are limited 
options for someone wishing to retire before that age.  Public pension schemes in other 
countries commonly offer early retirement options whereby one can choose to take a 
lower pension from an earlier age.  In New Zealand, the only public income support for 
someone leaving the labour market before age 65 is through the income-tested benefit 
system.  That support is at a lower rate than NZS and is subject to a tight income test and 
                                                                  
10  Prior to 1999, the Act made it unlawful to use age as the basis for dismissal or retirement, but only up to the standard age of 
eligibility for NZS.  
11  It might be argued that not being able to set a mandatory retirement age might discourage employers from employing older workers 
in the first place.   However a recent review of age discrimination legislation across a number of countries concluded that while it may 
have made employers a bit less likely to hire older workers, there is no evidence that this has been a major disincentive –  see 
Hornstein (2001).    
12  There is a small marginal income tax effect.  NZS is a component of taxable income and so can be thought of as attracting a higher 
effective tax when combined with earnings than when it is the sole source of income.  However there was a period of 12 years between 
1986 and 1998 where NZS was effectively income-tested, thereby reducing its net value more substantially than the marginal tax effect 
alone.  
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to meeting certain qualifying conditions, such as continuing to seek full-time employment, 
being medically unfit for employment, widowhood or having to care for a sick relative.
13
   
One partial exception to this conditionality arises in the case of the non-qualified spouse 
of a NZS recipient.  The age-qualified partner may receive the standard amount of NZS 
for themselves or instead choose for the couple to receive a higher amount in recognition 
of their non-qualified spouse but which is subject to abatement against their combined 
incomes.  It is possible, therefore, for a non-earning younger spouse (typically the wife) of 
a recipient to receive some NZS.
14
  This option enables couples to choose to retire at the 
same time once the older partner reaches the qualifying age for NZS.  It also explains why 
the tendency for early retirement of females, reported later in this paper, is financially 
feasible. 
3.2   Overall effect on incentives to retire 
It is possible now to assess New Zealand￿s retirement income policies using the analysis 
in Section 2.1 of how financial incentives affect retirement decisions.   
It is important to recognise that the main focus of retirement income policies in 
New Zealand is social protection rather than earnings replacement. From the point of view 
of the replacement rate effect, the standard amount of NZS corresponds to a wide range 
of earnings replacement rates depending on individual earnings.  High pre-retirement 
earnings produce a low replacement rate and a low incentive to retire, while for people 
with low earnings NZS offers a higher replacement rate and hence a stronger incentive to 
retire.  
Table 1 shows the gross incomes, before and after age 65, of someone with the average 
weekly earnings of those in each age group who are working full-time or part-time.  For a 
married person aged 64 working full-time and contemplating retirement next year, the 
relevant measure of the expected loss of consumption possibilities as a result of retiring 
might be NZS plus leisure next year versus earnings this year.  On this basis a 
representative full-time wage replacement rate is $235 divided by $953, or 25%, although 
it can be as high as 62% for someone working full-time on the minimum wage. 
Table 1 - Comparison of gross weekly incomes (earnings plus pension) before and 
after eligibility for NZS, married person  
  Full-time Part-time Retired 
Age 60-64  $953  $303  $0 / $212* 
Age 65 and over, including NZS  $1017  $481  $235 
* Available only if married to an older spouse who is qualified for NZS. 
Sources:   Average weekly earnings by age group, from New Zealand Income Survey, June 2005 quarter; rates of NZS (married 
person or non-qualified spouse) from 1 April 2005 from the Ministry of Social Development. 
For someone aged 65 or over who is choosing whether to continue working or to retire, 
however, the relevant income comparison is not NZS versus earnings, but NZS alone 
                                                                  
13  For example, a widow aged under 65 and living alone may receive an income-tested benefit that is about 69% of the NZS she 
would receive from age 65. 
14  The additional amount is equivalent to about 91% of the NZS rate for a qualified, married individual.  
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versus  earnings plus NZS.  On this basis, their replacement rate is $235 divided by 
$1017, or 23%, which is lower than the previous calculation, illustrating how the ability to 
stay in work beyond age 65 and receive a pension at the same time reduces the incentive 
to retire.   
Where the prospective retiree is single rather than married, NZS is paid at a higher rate 




The ￿joint retirement￿ option for a couple, mentioned in Section 3.1, is most likely to be 
financially attractive where the younger spouse (usually the wife) is aged 60-64 and is 
currently in part-time work.  In this case her income replacement rate is $212 divided by 
$303, or 70%. 
To summarise the retirement incentive effects associated with NZS, retiring before the 
eligibility age for NZS is financially very unattractive (replacement rate is zero) unless one 
has a private source of income or can access NZS indirectly via an older spouse.  Retiring 
at age 65 with no private income is moderately or highly attractive (replacement rates 
typically in the range 20% ￿ 50%) depending on wage rate, hours worked and marital 
status.  Continuing in employment beyond age 65 remains a financially attractive option 
for those who can command a high wage because their NZS entitlement is unaffected.  
Furthermore, the absence of any mandatory retirement provisions means that there is no 
restriction on being employed beyond age 65. 
3.3  Policy changes in 1977 
The post-war period saw a gradual rise in the proportion of men and women aged 60-64 
remaining in the labour force.  In that period old age income support could take one of two 
possible forms: a universal pension from age 65 and an income-tested age benefit 
available from age 60.  A weakening in New Zealand￿s economic performance in the 
1970s, together with a rise in the generosity of the income-tested age benefit for this age 
group, saw this trend reversed and the start of an accelerating decline in participation, as 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
                                                                  
15  The gross weekly amounts paid in 2005 were $310 for a single person who is living by themselves and $285 for a single person 
who is sharing accommodation with others. These rates compare with the married person amount of $235 shown in Table 1.  
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Males aged 60-64 Females aged 60-64  
Source: Department of Statistics (1990), Table 14. 
The introduction of National Superannuation in 1977 was an important factor in 
establishing 60 years as the ￿standard￿ retirement age and lowering the labour force 
participation rates of older workers.  This new form of public pension lowered the age of 
eligibility for non-income tested superannuation from 65 years to 60 years and raised the 
rate of payment.  Table 2 compares the two systems. 
Table 2 - Comparison of systems pre- and post 1977  
  Old system (pre-1977)  New system (from 1977) 
Non income tested component  Universal superannuation  National superannuation 
    Age of eligibility  From age 65  From age 60 
    Rate of payment – equivalent to a 
net of tax pension/avg wage ratio of: 
32.7% for a married person (July 
1976) 
39.1% for a married person (August 
1977); rising to 44.7% a year later, 
before settling at 40% from 1980. 
Income tested option  Age benefit 
    Age of eligibility  From age 60 
    Rate of payment – equivalent to a 
net of tax pension/wage ratio of: 




Number of payments in force  In 1976: 300,000 Total, of which: 
(112,000 universal super) 
(188,000 age benefit) 
In 1980: 405,000 Total 
Annual Expenditure (In 1980 dollars)  In 1976: $814 million  In 1980: $1,134 million 
Source: Preston (2001) and Department of Social Welfare annual report 1976.  
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The post-1977 system is hypothesised to have affected the retirement behaviour of three 
groups: 
  Group A. People aged 60-64 who had been planning to remain in employment 
until age 65, when they would become eligible for universal superannuation.   
These people could now choose to retire on national superannuation without being 
affected by the income test for age benefit. 
  Group B. People aged 65+ who had chosen to stay in employment in order to 
supplement the income they were receiving from universal superannuation.  The 
higher rate of national superannuation would encourage a proportion of these to 
leave the labour force.   
  Group C. People approaching the age of 60, with modest savings, who might 
choose to retire on these savings before age 60 in anticipation of receiving 
national superannuation from age 60. 
We might hypothesise that the strongest impact would be on Group A, which offered the 
largest (static) financial gain (from zero pension to national superannuation).  Figure 3 
tends to confirm this hypothesis.  It shows how the proportion of men in full-time 
employment for the age group most affected by this policy change (Group A) fell much 
more than those of slightly younger age groups (Group C).  It also shows a sizeable 
response to the income effect of the increase in pension rates among those over 65 
(Group B).  In the case of females the trend towards higher rates of full-time employment 
evident amongst those aged in their 50￿s becomes reversed from age 60 in response to 
eligibility for national superannuation. 



































males 1976 males 1981 females 1976 females 1981  
Source:  Data reported in Rochford (1985).  
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3.4  Policy changes in 1992 
During the 1980￿s the fiscal burden of paying a higher rate of national superannuation to a 
steadily increasing number of older people became a matter of growing concern and a 
number of policy steps were taken to trim back this cost.
16
  At the same time governments 
were facing the prospect of acceleration in public pension costs further in the future once 
the post-war ￿baby boom￿ generation started to retire from 2006 onwards. 
In 1989 the government announced that this prospective rise in pension costs would be 
addressed by gradually raising the age of eligibility from 60 to 65 between the years 2006 
and 2025.  This timing was chosen to coincide with the period of rapid growth in the 
number of older New Zealanders (Caygill, 1989).  However, following the change of 
government in 1991, the incoming administration decided to compress and bring forward 
the timing of this change as part of a comprehensive package of social policy changes 
aimed at fiscal consolidation.
17
 
The age of eligibility for NZS was to be raised progressively from 60 to 65 over the 
relatively brief timeframe of nine years, 1992 to 2001.  The schedule involved delaying 
payment to age 61 for those born in the period 1 April 1932 to 30 June 1932 and then 
raising the eligibility age by an additional 3 months for each successive 3-month birth 
cohort.  This formula resulted in the age of eligibility reaching 65 for people born after 31 
March 1936 and the transition was completed on 1 April 2001. 















Pop aged 60+ Pop aged 65+ Proposed transition






Source: Statistics New Zealand population projections. 
Figure 4 shows the difference between the originally proposed age transition and the one 
that was finally implemented, labelled NZS actual (1991).  It illustrates how the change in 
policy focus, from expenditure smoothing to fiscal consolidation, resulted in a very large 
                                                                  
16  The main measures were to reduce the ratio of the pension to national average weekly earnings and to introduce an element of 
income-testing via a tax surcharge on the other income of superannuitants. 
17  The 1991 package also included a temporary suspension of the normal indexation of pension rates and a tightening of the income 
testing regime that was in place at the time.  
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reduction in the number of people receiving the pension over the period of the transition.  
Also shown is the earlier 1976 policy change that lowered the eligibility age to 60.
18
  
The new transition started almost immediately after it was announced and was rapid.   
People who had been planning to retire at age 60 and who had little savings of their own 
were suddenly faced with having to delay their retirement.  To deal with this issue, a 
transitional assistance programme, known as the Transitional Retirement Benefit (TRB) 
was introduced for those who had been close to retirement at the time of the 
announcement.  This took the form of an income-tested benefit that did not require 
recipients to be medically assessed or to make themselves available for work.  The TRB 
was available to eligible cohorts for up to three years prior to the new eligibility age for 
NZS and phased out completely by April 2004. 
In its review of the framework of retirement income provision, carried out halfway through 
the transition, the Periodic Report Group (1997) noted the extent of the emerging change 
in employment rates among those most directly affected by the rising age of eligibility for 
NZS.  This change has continued and can be seen in the pattern of employment rates at 
single years of age over the complete transition period.  This is illustrated in Figure 5 
which shows, for the case of males, how the maximum rate of exit from full-time 
employment has shifted, from age 60 in 1991 to age 65 in 2001.
19
  
Figure 5 - Changing full-time employment rates of males by single year of age 











50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Age
1991 (NZS age 60) 1996 (NZS age 62.5) 2001 (NZS age 65)
 
Source: Census documents. 
Another way of illustrating this phenomenon is by calculating ￿exit work hazard rates￿, that 
is the probability that someone of a particular age will not be employed in a year￿s time, 
given that they were employed in the current year.  These estimates have several 
                                                                  
18  The 1976 arrow starts between ages 60 and 65 because a proportion of people aged 60 - 64 were already receiving an income 
tested Age Benefit. 
19  It is important to locate the census dates within the age transition schedule.  The 1991 census was held when the NZS eligibility 
age was 60 and the new policy had not been announced.  At the time of the March 1996 census, the eligibility age for NZS had moved 
from 62 years 3 months to 62 years 6 months; in other words it was half way through its transition.  By the time of the 2001 census the 
transition was complete and the age of eligibility was fixed at 65. 
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 but follow the general approach of Gruber and Wise (1999) in examining 
empirical regularities between retirement hazard rates and pension eligibility ages across 
countries.  
Figure 6 contrasts the exit work hazard rate patterns for males in 1991, 1996 and 2001.  
The peak hazard rate shifted from 60 to 65, reflecting the shift in NZS eligibility age.  At 
the same time the peak has become somewhat less pronounced, indicating a lessening of 
the tendency towards a ￿standard￿ retirement age
21
 and perhaps also easier access to 
other income-tested support for those approaching age 65 under the TRB. 









51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
Age
1991 (NZS age 60) 1996 (NZS age 62.5) 2001 (NZS age 65)
 
Source: Census documents. 
4  Estimating policy impacts 
In order to estimate the impact of the NZS eligibility age on retirement behaviour, we need 
consistent data on the labour force participation patterns of older males and females 
covering the whole period between 1976 and 2001.  Census data is available at five 
yearly intervals for the whole period, but two particular limitations need to be noted. 
First, tabular data for the early years is available only in 5-year age groups rather than by 
single year of age, so the model uses these groupings, starting with those aged 45-49 
years and with an upper category of age 65 and over.  
Second, the definition of labour force participation has been revised over the years, 
reflecting first the exclusion of people in part-time employment and then a change in the 
number of hours per week that constituted part-time employment.  For this estimation 
exercise the current Statistics New Zealand definition of a labour force participant has 
been adopted, namely a person who either works regularly for one or more hours per 
                                                                  
20  They are based on cross-sectional census data, rather than longitudinal sample data and make no adjustment for mortality, so 
cannot strictly be interpreted as the probability of retirement by somebody who is currently employed.  
21  As noted in Section 3.1, New Zealand has anti-age discrimination legislation that does not allow employment contracts to specify a 
mandatory retirement age.  
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week or is unemployed and was seeking work during the week prior to the census.  Earlier 




Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate how the labour force participation rates of males and 
females in different age groups have changed over the period 1976 to 2001.  It is these 
data that the following model seeks to explain.  Key features to note are: the trend for 
participation rates for males to generally fall over time, while rates for females generally 
rise; and the changing trend in participation rates within the 60-64 year age group 
compared with younger age groups. 












45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65 and over
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001  
Source: Census documents and author’s calculations. 












45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65 and over
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001  
Source:  Census documents and author’s calculations. 
                                                                  
22  In particular, the 1976 census numbers classified as ‘actively engaged’ (i.e. working 20+ hours per week) has been augmented by 
the proportion of those ‘not actively engaged’ who were employed for 1-19 hours per week, allocated across age groups according to 
the propensity of their employment status to be classified as retired, full-time student, household duties (unpaid) or other.   
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4.1 The  model 
The determinants of labour force participation rates among older people have been 
modelled as follows. 
Pgjt = a + bUt + cEgjt + dDgj + εgjt (1)   
where Pgjt is the labour force participation rate of a particular gender (g) and age group (j) 
in a census year (t); Ut is the general unemployment rate in that year; and Egjt indicates 
the proportion of each gender and age group that is eligible to receive NZS in census year 
t
23
.  Dgj is a vector of dummy variables that capture age group and gender influences and 
εgjt is a normally distributed random error term.
24
 
The eligibility variable, E, is interacted with the gender variable to allow for differential 
responses by males and females to being eligible for NZS.  In addition, the model allows 
for the possibility that females who are within five years of being eligible for NZS might 
retire at the same time as their (older on average) husbands, since there is some financial 
assistance for those who do so.
25
 
Separate age-group dummies for males and females have been used to pick up possible 
gender differences in age/retirement profiles and to avoid imposing any particular 
functional form on the profile.  This specification constrains the profiles to be the same 
across different cohorts.  However, the long-term trend of rising female labour force 




The estimated model uses data covering 6 census years (1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 
2001), 2 genders and 5 age groups (45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65 and over), giving a 
total of 60 observations.  The estimated coefficients are shown in Table 3 and all are 
statistically significant at the 99% level, except for one age-group dummy. 
                                                                  
23  E takes the value 0 for age groups under 60 and 1 for the age group 65+.  For the age group 60-64, E = 0.28 (0.40) for males 
(females) in 1976, which reflects the proportions in that age group receiving the income-tested Age Benefit, E = 1 in 1981, 1986 and 
1991, E = 0.5 in 1996 (half way through the eligibility age transition), and E = 0 in 2001.   
24  Since the observation periods are each five years apart, the risk of serially correlated error terms is small, and the model has been 
estimated using ordinary least squares.   
25  This is a gender-neutral policy but has been modelled as most likely to influence female’s decisions.  The older, qualifying spouse 
may opt for an alternative, higher rate of NZS, subject to an income test on the couple’s joint income.  If the younger, non-qualifying 
spouse is still in employment, her earnings are likely to make this an infeasible option. 
26  A linear time trend assumption becomes problematic for longer term projections since it ignores the likelihood that the rise in female 
participation rates will ease back as they approach male rates.  
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Table 3 - Determinants of labour force participation 
Independent variable  Coefficient  t value 
Constant 98.76  74.69 
Unemployment rate  
(average over year to date of census) 
-1.098 -6.77 
Eligible for NZS (0, proportion, 1))  -21.44  -7.79 
Female*eligible for NZS (0, proportion, 1)  14.54  2.74 
Female*near eligibility for NZS (0, proportion, 
1) 
-11.46 -3.97 
Female (0,1)  -42.96  -21.57 
Log time trend for females not eligible for NZS 
(trend based on 1976 = 1, 1981 = 2 etc) 
18.60 16.22 
Dummy for males aged 50-54  -2.167  -1.14 
Dummy for males aged 55-59  -9.283  -6.01 
Dummy for males aged 60-64  -29.75  -12.81 
Dummy for males aged 65+  -57.76  -18.30 
Dummy for females aged 50-54  -7.833  -5.07 
Dummy for females aged 55-59  -16.03  -76.59 
Dummy for females aged 60-64  -26.59  -6.96 
Dummy for females aged 65+  -38.32  -8.68 
Dependent variable: age group/gender specific %age participating in the labour force in census year t. 
N=60;  Adjusted R squared = 0.9928. 
The underlying participation profiles for men and women as they age can be estimated by 
combining the constant term and the average unemployment effect with the values for the 
age/gender dummy variables ￿ these are shown in Figure 9.   





















1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001  
Notes:  (1) Calculations include the estimated effect of unemployment, based on the average unemployment rate of 4.6% for the 
six census observations.  (2)  Female participation trends include a log time trend interacted with being ineligible for NZS.  
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For men, abstracting from NZS eligibility, the pattern is for a decelerating rate of 
participation, i.e. an accelerating rate of retirement, from age 45 onwards, with no 
particular ￿kink￿.  This is what one would expect as a result of factors such as maturing 
private retirement savings or rising rates of health problems that trigger retirement 
decisions.  However, when eligibility for NZS is triggered, the estimated coefficient on the 
eligibility variable in Table 3 indicates that the participation rate drops by a further 21 
percentage points (this is not shown in Figure 9). 
The picture is more complicated in the case of women, since part of the impact of NZS 
eligibility shows up in Figure 9 through the female participation time trend term, which 
stops applying once a female becomes eligible for NZS.  In addition there is a direct 
depressive effect of a further 7 percentage points (-21.44 +14.54 from Table 3) on 
women￿s labour force participation rates after they become eligible for NZS.  This second 
effect is not shown in Figure 9. 
The total percentage point effect on participation rates of NZS eligibility turns out to be 
similar for women and men.  For example, in 1991 NZS eligibility was set at age 60.  This 
model suggests that if the eligibility age had in fact been 65 at that time, the labour force 
participation rates of 60-64 year old males and females in 1991 would each have been 
about 21 percentage points higher.
27
  Of course these percentage point changes would 
have translated into different total percentage changes for men and women (53% and 
170% respectively) because of their different base levels of participation.  
Finally, the results in Table 3 also indicate that there is a drop in the average participation 
rates of women if they are within five years of becoming eligible for NZS in their own right.  
This effect is estimated to lower participation in the near-eligible age band by 11 
percentage points.  This is most likely to reflect ￿joint retirement￿ choices by couples when 
the (typically older) husband starts to receive NZS. 
4.2  Forecasting future participation rates of older people 
The model can also be used to obtain some idea of the future evolution of participation 
rates, although there are some limitations.  Projections over the next ten years (i.e. two 
census periods) using the estimated parameters in this model suggest that the 
participation rates of older males and females will remain quite buoyant, assuming the age 
of NZS eligibility remains at 65.   
A simulation of the effect of a further rise in the age of eligibility, to 66 by 2006 and to 68 
by 2011, is illustrated in Figure 10 and Figure 11, for males and females respectively.  
This suggests that the participation rate of the 65+ group would be around 3 percentage 
points higher for males and 6 percentage points higher for females.  However, one needs 
to be cautious in interpreting these estimates, since they are very sensitive to the form of 
the time trend chosen for female participation.  Furthermore, the effect would be 
concentrated in only a small proportion of this open-ended age band.
28
 
                                                                  
27  For females this is the net result of switching off the ‘NZS eligible’ and ‘female eligible’ dummies and switching on the ‘female near 
eligibility’ dummy and the time trend effect. 
28  Currently 17 percent of the 65+ age group are aged below 68 and so would be directly affected by this simulated policy change.  
However, once the baby boomers start to enter that age group, around 2011, this proportion will start to rise.  
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45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 raise age 65 and over raise age to 68  
5  Summary and conclusions 
This paper has attempted to explain changes in the labour force participation rate of older 
people over the past 30 years and in particular to estimate the impact of changing the age 
of eligibility of NZS.  A relatively simple model that includes the general unemployment 
rate, age group, whether that age group is currently eligible for NZS, gender and a secular 
rising trend in female participation can explain a high proportion of the variation in 
participation rates.  This model suggests that being eligible for NZS drops the participation 
rate of males by around 21 percentage points and of females by around 7 percentage 
points.  The model suggests that female participation rates are also influenced by the age  
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of eligibility a few years before that age is actually reached, a drop of a further 11 
percentage points. 
There is considerable research and policy interest in many countries on initiatives to 
reduce the fiscal burden of public pension schemes, to avert the prospect of a shrinking 
workforce and to create greater growth potential.  Much of this interest has centred on 
understanding how the financial incentives created by public pension rules impact on 
individual retirement decisions.  The results of that research suggest that three 
mechanisms are important: the age at which people become eligible for retirement 
benefits (both the ￿standard￿ and the minimum early retirement age); a person￿s current 
pension/earnings replacement rate; and the net present value of a person￿s future stream 
of pension entitlements (compared with their future earnings stream) when this varies with 
age and contributions.  
5.1  New Zealand incentives to stay in the labour market 
This paper has examined how these three mechanisms operate in New Zealand￿s case. It 
appears that public pension design contains several features that create stronger 
incentives on older workers to remain in the labour force than exist in most other 
countries.  These features work both to avoid penalising those who choose to work 
beyond NZS eligibility age and to discourage early retirement, i.e. prior to NZS eligibility 
age. 
First, there is no legal impediment to continuing to be employed beyond the NZS eligibility 
age; New Zealand does not have a legislated compulsory retirement age, nor are 
individual employers permitted to specify a mandatory retirement age in contracts of 
employment. 
Second, because NZS is neither work-tested nor income-tested, it is possible to continue 
earning and receiving NZS with no financial penalty.  One implication is that it offers 
greater timing choice and flexibility for people wishing to manage their transition from full-
time work to complete retirement or to arrange to take spells in and out of the labour 
market.  It also offers an alternative means to accumulate savings in order to top-up their 
income later on for those who have not done this earlier in their working lives.   
A third feature, the absence of an early eligibility option for NZS, increases the likelihood 
that people adopt the standard age as the ￿normal￿ age to retire and will remain in the 
labour market at least until they become eligible for NZS.  This may be seen in the low exit 
work hazard rates prior to NZS eligibility age, shown in Figure 6.   
The fourth feature is that, no doubt inadvertently, public pension policy has tended to 
crowd out private provision.  The option for workers to accumulate private savings to 
finance early retirement or to top-up their public pension was not particularly attractive for 
the generation of New Zealanders who were approaching retirement during the period 
1977 ￿ 1991.  The public pension was available at the relatively early age of 60 and it was 
set at a historically generous level (see Table 2).  
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Furthermore, savings attracted few tax concessions and, for some of this period, the 
returns from private saving faced the prospect of a tax surcharge.
29
  Faced with these 
signals and employed at a time of inflation, economic restructuring and considerable 
labour market uncertainty, it is hardly surprising that that generation approached age 60 
with generally low levels of non-housing wealth. 
This meant that when the age of eligibility for NZS started to be raised in 1991 many of 
those immediately affected did not have a cushion of private savings sufficient to allow 
them to retire any earlier.  The Transitional Retirement Benefit described in Section 3.4 
provided an element of choice and probably helped to achieve public acceptance of the 
policy change.  Nevertheless, a high proportion of potential retirees remained in the labour 
market and the result was the strong participation response reported in Section 4.1.  
5.2  Changing prospects for baby boomers 
Some of the factors that discouraged private saving and early retirement, and that 
contributed to the rise in labour force participation among older age groups, are likely to 
be much less relevant to the upcoming generation of potential retirees.  In particular, the 
first wave of the baby-boom generation, currently aged 55-59, may observe that public 
pension policy rules can and have been changed at quite short notice.  They may note 
that, while they are probably guaranteed a reasonable basic income from age 65, their 
earnings replacement rate is lower than would have been the case for those retiring 25 
years earlier.  Furthermore, because of the much larger size of their own cohort, there is 
little prospect of earnings replacement rates being raised without placing a heavy strain on 
other taxpayers and the long-term sustainability of the public pension system. 
At the same time, growing skill levels and some widening in the distribution of earnings 
over the past 20 years suggests that a growing proportion of older workers have earnings 
that are high relative to the average weekly earnings measure that is used to benchmark 
NZS.  It is this high earning group that is most likely to seek to top-up their NZS with 
private income in order to maintain their standard of living in retirement. 
As a result we might expect to see a higher rate of private wealth accumulation among the 
baby boom generation than their parent￿s generation.  If this is the case, there are two 
possible consequences of relevance to this paper.  
First, higher levels of voluntary private wealth accumulation might be drawn on by a 
greater proportion of this cohort to finance early retirement or periods out of the workforce 
for lifestyle reasons.  This would start to show up as a new downturn in labour force 




                                                                  
29  Until 1987 there was a capped income exemption in respect of life insurance premiums and contributions to approved 
superannuation schemes.  
30  There are also possible countervailing reasons why savers might choose to extend their time in the workforce, such as wanting to 
make the most of their investment in work skills, trading off leisure time for enhanced future consumption or continuing to financially 
support other family members  
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The second consequence of higher savings among the baby boom generation is that, in 
the event of a future increase in the age of NZS eligibility, the positive labour market 
participation response might be much weaker than was observed in the 1991-2001 period.  
Many people would be better placed to choose whether to fund retirement at the age they 
had planned to or to stay working until the new age of eligibility.  In this circumstance, 
therefore, the rates of labour force participation among those aged 65+ could turn out to 
be lower than those projected for the hypothetical policy change in Figure 10 and Figure 
11. 
Finally, I suggest that, in conjunction with evidence on the living standards of older 
people
31
, these results paint a generally encouraging picture of New Zealand￿s public 
pension system from the point of view of positive aging and continuing active 
engagement.  Whether the system will remain fiscally sustainable at its current settings 
remains an open question, but rising rates of labour force participation among older 
people gives cause for some optimism. 
 
                                                                  
31  Fergusson et al (2001) reports that the material living standards of older people are generally better than for working age people.   
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